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This volume compiles selected studies conducted through the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research (NBER) Center for Retirement Research. The
center was created in 2003 with funding from the U.S. Social Security Ad-
ministration and is structured to provide analysis that can inform Social
Security policy. In setting our research agenda, we have been guided by
three principles. First, reform must recognize the changing and uncertain
environment in which the Social Security system will operate. Second, sev-
eral alternative routes to sustainable solvency should be explored. Third,
the potential routes to solvency should be evaluated for “resiliency” to fu-
ture uncertain demographic, economic, and social trends.
While some of the center’s research focuses directly on Social Security
reform, other research aims to inform Social Security policy by analyzing
the changing economic environment in which future Social Security ben-
eﬁciaries will live. For example, several of our center’s projects have stud-
ied trends in private-sector retirement saving—particularly the shift from
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) to deﬁned contribution (DC) pension plans—be-
cause the “optimal” Social Security replacement rate may evolve as the
structure of private retirement savings changes over time. We have also
studied trends in health care costs because decisions about Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts, and indeed how much of society’s resources to devote to So-
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search.cial Security, may depend in part on health care costs. And we have stud-
ied the uncertain nature of future demographic, economic, and social
trends—such as the age structure of the population, marriage and divorce
rates, women’s labor force participation, productivity, market rates of re-
turn, and the like.
The volume is organized into ﬁve parts. Part I introduces several inno-
vative approaches to Social Security reform. Part II examines individual
behavior in making retirement saving decisions, such as how much to save
or how to allocate savings among alternative investment options. Part III
analyzes diﬀerent approaches to reducing the ﬁnancial market risk faced
by individuals who invest in personal retirement accounts. Part IV looks
at aggregate trends in retirement asset ﬂows and their eﬀect on macro-
economic markets. Part V considers health trends and their projected
eﬀects on future mortality. This introduction summarizes each of the chap-
ters, drawing heavily on the authors’ own summaries.
Innovative Approaches to Social Security Reform
In recent years, the debate about Social Security reform in the United
States has focused on a limited range of proposals, a fact which may have
contributed to the partisan nature of reform discussions. An important
aim of our center is to expand the range of approaches considered and to
assess the resiliency of alternative proposals to uncertain future demo-
graphic, ﬁnancial, and other trends. The ﬁrst three chapters in this volume
analyze new ideas for Social Security reform. The ﬁrst considers reforms
that would remove the disincentive in Social Security for long careers. The
second analyzes notional deﬁned contribution social security systems and
evaluates their ability to self-adjust to uncertain future circumstances, and
thus to retain their ﬁnancial stability over the long term. The third devel-
ops a reform proposal based on progressive personal accounts, which
blend characteristics of funded personal accounts with some of the core
objectives of traditional social security policy.
In chapter 1, “Removing the Disincentives in Social Security for Long
Careers,” Gopi Shah Goda, John B. Shoven, and Sita Nataraj Slavov ex-
plore the relationship between Social Security policy and labor market be-
havior at older ages. Since Social Security was instituted in 1935, life ex-
pectancy at age twenty has increased from sixty-six to seventy-six for men
and from sixty-nine to eighty for women. Health at older ages has also im-
proved. Such dramatic advances in health and longevity mean that people
have the physical and mental capability to work until older ages. Yet people
are retiring younger, even as they live longer and healthier lives. Indeed, the
duration of retirement has grown by even more than the increase in life ex-
pectancy at retirement.
Godi, Shoven, and Slavov consider the role of Social Security policy in
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cisions of older workers. They highlight the features of Social Security that
discourage long careers, discourage work at older ages, and increase the
number of years in retirement. The main ﬁnding of the chapter is that So-
cial Security imposes high implicit tax rates on workers late in their careers.
As a result of this distortion, the duration of retirement is suboptimally
long, compounding the ﬁnancial stress on public and private retirement
support systems.
One example of the distortion in Social Security is how beneﬁts are cal-
culated based on the highest thirty-ﬁve years of earnings. This means that
the thirty-third, thirty-fourth, and thirty-ﬁfth years of work noticeably im-
prove retirement beneﬁts by replacing a “zero” in the beneﬁt calculation
formula. The thirty-sixth year of work, on the other hand, may or may not
count, and if it does, it will replace a lower year of earnings and not a zero
in the calculation. Thus, the beneﬁt formula discourages careers of more
than thirty-ﬁve years. Another aspect of the beneﬁt formula oﬀers dispro-
portionately higher beneﬁts to workers with short careers, treating them
with the same redistributive advantages as if they were lower earners. Both
characteristics of the beneﬁt formula lead to high implicit tax rates at older
ages and for longer careers.
The authors suggest three reforms that would reduce the distortionary
impact of Social Security at older ages. First, they propose using forty
years, rather than thirty-ﬁve, in beneﬁt computation. Second, they propose
disentangling career length and progressivity in the beneﬁt formula. And
third, they propose to establish a “paid-up” category of workers who have
more than forty years of contributions, who would no longer be subject to
the payroll tax. The study ﬁnds that these proposed changes would elimi-
nate most of the large positive tax rates for older workers. They would also
reduce the association between age and tax rate and move tax rates closer
to zero for most workers in most years of their lives. With these changes,
the implicit tax rates associated with Social Security remain roughly con-
stant over a worker’s life, resulting in less distortion of career length
choices. The authors ﬁnd, in addition, that the proposed reforms need not
aﬀect the overall progressivity of the Social Security system. However, by
reallocating beneﬁts from those with shorter careers to those with longer
careers, the reforms would result in less insurance against adverse shocks
that cause people to work for fewer years.
The study concludes that by eliminating the disincentives against work-
ing longer careers, we can capitalize on the good fortunes of increasing life
expectancy and favorable health status by paving the way for those in good
health to stay in the labor force longer.
In chapter 2, “Notional Deﬁned Contribution Pension Systems in a Sto-
chastic Context: Design and Stability,” Alan J. Auerbach and Ronald Lee
explore a new approach to Social Security reform that is known as “No-
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(NDC). Sweden was the ﬁrst country to introduce an NDC system. A num-
ber of other countries have introduced NDC plans, including Italy, Poland,
Latvia, Mongolia, and the Kyrgyz Republic, and proposed plans for
France and Germany have NDC aspects.
The NDC programs diﬀer in detail, but the basic principle is that they
mimic deﬁned contribution plans without actually setting aside ﬁnancial
assets. Thus, some of the beneﬁts of fully funded deﬁned contribution
plans can be achieved—particularly the improved labor supply incentives
from a more transparent link between current taxes and future retirement
beneﬁts—while avoiding the transitional diﬃculties of converting from
an unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system. Under an NDC program, a
“notional” capital account is maintained for each participant. Balances in
this account earn a rate of return that is declared by the pension plan each
year, and notional payments into this account are made over the entire life
history to mirror actual taxes or contributions by plan participants. After
a designated age such as sixty-two, a participant can begin to draw bene-
ﬁts, which is done by using the account to purchase an annuity from the
pension plan. The terms of the annuity will depend on mortality risk at that
time and on a rate of return stipulated by the pension plan.
While NDC plans are seen as having various potential advantages over
traditional PAYGO systems, the focus of this chapter is on their ﬁnancial
stability over the long term. The stability results from three factors. First,
the rate of return in the notional accounts reﬂects the underlying PAYGO
nature of the program and is based on what is expected to be aﬀordable
over time. Second, the annuity structure should buﬀer the system from the
uncertain costs of rising longevity. And third, in the event that the pro-
gram’s ﬁnances move toward imbalance, a braking mechanism can be in-
corporated that automatically modiﬁes the rate of return to help restore
the plan to ﬁnancial health. Given the political diﬃculties of making fre-
quent changes in PAYGO pension programs, the attractiveness of an in-
herently stable and self-adjusting system is clear.
In this chapter, Auerbach and Lee use a stochastic macroeconomic
model for forecasting and simulating the long-term ﬁnances of NDC-type
public pension programs in the context of demographic and economic
trends in the United States. Because future patterns of demographic and
economic change are uncertain, the model generates a probability distri-
bution of outcomes (beneﬁt ﬂows and rates of return) for generations of
plan participants for the NDC program, as well as for the overall ﬁnancial
stability of the NDC system.
The study ﬁnds that an NDC system similar to that currently in use in
Sweden, which bases rates of return on the growth rate of average wages
and utilizes a brake to adjust the rate of return during periods of ﬁnancial
stress, eﬀectively eliminates the accumulation of debt in the Social Security
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stances. Thus, the system is eﬀective in preventing inadequate funding of
Social Security obligations over the long term.
What this version of an NDC system does not do is adjust automatically
to situations when there is excess money accumulating in the system. Put
diﬀerently, the braking mechanism is asymmetric, automatically making
corrections when the ﬁnancial balances of the system move toward in-
creased debt, but without correction when the ﬁnancial balances move to-
ward asset accumulation. Only a symmetric brake, which raises rates of re-
turn during periods of ﬁnancial strength, avoids large accumulations of
ﬁnancial assets.
Other ﬁndings from the simulations are ﬁrst, that the brake can be more
gradual than under the Swedish system and still provide a stable distribu-
tion of outcomes; second, that an NDC system in which rates of return are
based on total rather than per capita economic growth is inherently more
stable; and third, that a considerable share of the volatility in the ﬁnancial
performance of NDC systems is attributable to economic uncertainty,
rather than demographic uncertainty.
In chapter 3, “Reforming Social Security with Progressive Personal Ac-
counts,” John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes develop yet another ap-
proach to Social Security reform. Their reform plan is designed to preserve
the core objectives of the current Social Security system and, at the same
time, gain the beneﬁts of personal accounts.
Advocates for retaining the current system argue that Social Security
should redistribute wealth from those who have earned more over their
whole working lives to those who have earned less. They also suggest that
diﬀerent generations should share in the risks and beneﬁts of macroeco-
nomic growth. So if real wages go up over time, retirees should get some
beneﬁt from those macroeconomic gains, even though they are no longer
working. Advocates for personal accounts, on the other hand, support
ownership by individuals of tangible assets that cannot be revoked by a fu-
ture government. They also like the idea that people know the current mar-
ket valuation of their retirement resources, as they are accrued over time,
so that rational planning for retirement can take place outside of Social Se-
curity.
Geanakoplos and Zeldes seek to ﬁnd a common ground between these
two approaches and to develop a plan that preserves the core goals of each
one. They demonstrate that it is possible to convert Social Security into a
system of personal accounts with irrevocable ownership of market priced
assets, while at the same time redistributing beneﬁts based on lifetime in-
come and sharing macroeconomic gains across generations. They refer to
the plan as progressive personal accounts.
The proposed system uses the payroll tax to buy assets in a personal re-
tirement account for each Social Security recipient. Income-based redis-
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these Social Security contributions. High lifetime earners receive lower
matches (or a tax) on contributions to their personal account, while low
lifetime earners receive a higher government match. Risk sharing across
generations is accomplished through the creation of a new kind of deriva-
tive security whose payoﬀs depend on the average earnings of those work-
ing at a speciﬁc point in time. So if younger workers are doing well and re-
ceiving high wages, the old will get higher payoﬀs from their investment
in the derivative security. Every year a worker would pay the Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) payroll tax and receive a certain number of
these securities in the worker’s account.
According to the authors, it is possible to create a system of progressive
personal accounts that exactly mimics the promised taxes and payouts of
the current Social Security system. The resulting system would preserve
some of the core goals of Social Security, as it is structured today, but
would also improve upon it due to the increased transparency, enhanced
property rights, and lower political risk (of legislation removing beneﬁts)
that naturally come with individual accounts. Chapter 3 lays out the me-
chanics of such a system in detail.
Retirement Plan Choice
With the growth of 401(k)-type plans, retirement saving is becoming an
increasingly important complement to Social Security as a component of
ﬁnancial support in retirement. In addition, some Social Security reform
proposals would supplement the deﬁned beneﬁts provided by the current
U.S. Social Security system with either voluntary or mandatory personal
retirement accounts (PRAs). The increasing importance of individually-
owned retirement savings accounts, whether integrated within the Social
Security system or outside the system, will make decision making by indi-
viduals a more important aspect of retirement planning in the future. The
next two chapters in the volume look at how people make decisions about
retirement plans when individual decisions need to be made.
In chapter 4, “Who Chooses Deﬁned Contribution Plans?,” Jeﬀrey R.
Brown and Scott J. Weisbenner analyze the decisions made by a group of
50,000 workers who currently have a choice between a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB)
and a deﬁned contribution (DC) pension system. Their study is based on
the experience of employees in the State Universities Retirement System
(SURS) of Illinois, where workers make a one-time, lifetime, irrevocable
choice among three retirement plans: (1) a traditional formula-based DB
plan; (2) a “portable DB plan,” which is slightly less generous than the tra-
ditional DB program if one retires from the system, but more generous if
the worker takes an early lump-sum distribution; and (3) a completely self-
managed DC plan. Individuals who fail to make an active choice within the
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tional DB plan.
Other aspects of the SURS experience are also relevant to the study.
First, the wages of individuals earned from SURS-covered employment
are not also covered by Social Security. So for most, the decision made is a
decision about people’s primary source of income in retirement. Second,
the combined employer/employee retirement contributions to the SURS
system are at least 14.6 percent of annual salary, which is larger than the
payroll tax paid by those in the Social Security system. Therefore, the
SURS system looms large as part of a participant’s lifetime ﬁnancial plan.
And third, the choice of retirement programs is available to employees with
diverse job characteristics and earnings, including campus administrators,
faculty members, clerical staﬀ, university police and ﬁre protection work-
ers, and others.
There are two major ﬁndings from the study. First, despite initial pro-
jections that a majority of new employees would actively select the self-
managed DC plan or portable DB plan, the evidence is that a majority of
new employees never makes an active pension choice and, thus, are de-
faulted into the traditional DB plan. The proportion of new employees not
making a choice among plans, and hence defaulting into the traditional
DB plan, has been roughly three-ﬁfths over the period 2001 to 2004.
Second, approximately 15 percent of new employees choose the self-
managed DC plan, despite the fact that the DC plan is likely inferior to the
portable DB plan, given the ﬁnancial features of the various plans and rea-
sonable assumptions about future ﬁnancial market returns. Interestingly,
individuals are more likely than average to choose the self-managed DC
plan if they are more highly educated, have higher earnings, are married,
and work in a location where a higher fraction of other employees also
chose the self-managed plan. The ﬁndings suggest that these “educated,
high earning, young professionals” have a strong preference for DC plans,
even when the ﬁnancial terms are unfavorable. For example, among the 650
individuals in the sample who are full-time, aged thirty to thirty-nine, aca-
demics at a university, married, have earnings in excess of $50,000, and are
still active employees as of spring 2006, 52 percent of them chose the self-
managed DC plan, compared with 15 percent in the sample as a whole.
The analysis raises the question of why some individuals appear to make
suboptimal choices. The authors speculate that there are at least ﬁve rea-
sons why they may do so. First, participants may simply have diﬃculty pro-
cessing the complex information that they are provided when making this
choice, due either to time constraints or some form of bounded rationality.
Second, the information provided by SURS may not be optimally designed
to facilitate meaningful comparisons between the self-managed DC plan
and the portable beneﬁts package. Third, individuals may understand the
rules, but may overestimate their investment abilities, or the expected mar-
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cal risk in the traditional or portable beneﬁt plans, arising from the chronic
underfunding of the SURS system. Fifth, individuals may place a high
value on choice for its own sake. In continuing research, the authors are ex-
ploring these alternative hypotheses using a survey of current SURS par-
ticipants.
In chapter 5, “The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Sav-
ing Outcomes: Evidence from the United States,” John Beshears, James J.
Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian look at a very similar issue
in the context of 401(k) plans. In this case, the worker’s decision is about
whether to enroll in the 401(k) plan, what portion of their income to allo-
cate to the plan, and how to invest it among the various investment options
oﬀered in the plan. Much like the previous chapter, a core ﬁnding is that de-
faults matter a lot. Many people avoid making an active decision about
their retirement saving, and so the default provisions of their 401(k) plan
are what people end up doing “by default.”
The chapter summarizes a breadth of empirical evidence on how the de-
fault provisions of retirement saving plans impact savings behavior along
multiple dimensions, such as savings plan participation, savings rates, as-
set allocation, and postretirement savings distributions. The ﬁndings are
that defaults impact savings outcomes at every step along the way. For ex-
ample, some 401(k) plans have automatic enrollment, requiring employees
to explicitly “opt-out” of the plan. Others require eligible employees to ac-
tively enroll in the plan, or “opt-in.” Automatic enrollment is found to dra-
matically raise participation rates.
When the 401(k) plan has a default savings rate and a default investment
allocation, employees are much more likely to choose those defaults, rather
than to specify an alternative. As a result, the higher the default contribu-
tion rate, the higher the savings rate among those participating. Defaults
even matter when employees leave their jobs, and their 401(k) balances
may be left in the account, or they may be distributed to employees with the
option to roll over the funds to another retirement plan. When the funds
are distributed (which happens automatically in most smaller accounts),
they are much more likely to be removed permanently from retirement sav-
ing, while undistributed funds tend to be left in the plans.
The ﬁndings of this study are relevant not only to the design of a com-
pany’s 401(k) plan, but also to how one would structure a personal account
system within Social Security. For example, a voluntary PRA system
within Social Security would lead to higher participation and higher sav-
ing if it has automatic enrollment (rather than requiring active enrollment)
and if the default savings rate is higher. The ﬁndings on asset allocation are
also relevant and suggest careful attention to the investment options made
available to participants as well as to the default allocations among them.
A clear conclusion of this research is that defaults are not neutral—they
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phasize that current public policies toward saving include examples of
both.
Reducing Financial Market Risk in Personal Retirement Accounts
The next section of the volume also relates to the increasing importance
of individual retirement saving and, particularly, to the potential implica-
tions of a PRA component in Social Security. A signiﬁcant concern, par-
ticularly if PRAs were to become part of Social Security, is with the impo-
sition of investment risk on plan participants. The concern is that the
economic well-being of some retirees could be undermined by poor invest-
ment returns. There is, therefore, great interest in strategies that could re-
duce the riskiness of PRAs while preserving the other features of PRAs.
While the chapters in this section are focused on reducing the risk of PRAs,
the results are also relevant to retirement saving taking place in 401(k)
plans and other ﬁnancial accounts that are separate from Social Security.
The ﬁrst chapter in this section considers ﬁnancial market products that
cap downside market risk. The second analyzes an approach in which the
government would guarantee a minimum investment return. The third
studies the extent to which life-cycle investment strategies could reduce the
variance in retirement income levels. The fourth investigates the extent to
which increased progressivity in the traditional Social Security system
could be used to buﬀer lower-income retirees against PRA market risk.
In chapter 6, “Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security
Reform,” Martin Feldstein presents a market-based approach to reducing
the risk of investment-based Social Security that could be tailored to indi-
vidual risk preferences. With this new form of risk reduction, substituting
an investment-based PRA for the traditional pure PAYGO plan could
achieve both a signiﬁcantly higher expected retirement income and a very
high probability that the investment-based annuity would be at least as
large as the PAYGO beneﬁt. A key feature of the approach developed in the
chapter is a guarantee that the individual would not lose any of the real
value of each year’s PRA savings and might be guaranteed to earn at least
some minimum real rate of return.
In one example of such a plan, the current 12.4 percent PAYGO tax is
compared with a mixed plan that has a 6.2 percent PAYGO tax and 6.2 per-
cent annual PRA savings. This new mixed plan, when fully phased in,
would have the following desirable characteristics: (1) The median value of
the combined retirement income (i.e., the sum of the PAYGO beneﬁt and
the PRA annuity) would be 147 percent of the traditional PAYGO beneﬁt.
(2) There would be a 95 percent probability that the combined retirement
income (the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity) exceeds the traditional
PAYGO beneﬁt. (3) There would be less than one chance in 100 that the
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tional PAYGO beneﬁt. (4) Each year’s PRA saving would be guaranteed to
earn at least a 1 percent real rate of return between the time that it is saved
and its value at age sixty-six. It is, therefore, referred to in the chapter as a
“No Lose” plan. (5) The variable annuity purchased at age sixty-six would
have a similar “No Lose” feature, that is, a guaranteed real rate of return
of at least 1 percent.
The “No Lose” concepts developed in the chapter rely on ﬁnancial in-
struments already available in the marketplace. The idea is that the amount
saved in a PRA each year would be guaranteed to retain at least its real
value by age sixty-six. The simplest way to achieve such a No Lose PRA ac-
count would be to combine Treasury Inﬂation-Protected Securities (TIPS,
which have a guaranteed real return) with equities. The fraction of the an-
nual PRA saving that would have to be invested in TIPS to guarantee that
the annual PRA saving would retain its real value by age sixty-six depends
on the age of the saver and the rate of return on the TIPS of the relevant
maturity. For example, if the saver is twenty-one years old and the real re-
turn on TIPS is 2 percent, a $1,000 PRA saving would be divided between
$410 in TIPS and the remaining $590 in equities. The 2 percent real return
and the forty-ﬁve-year investment period imply that the $410 would accu-
mulate to $1,000 at the initial price level by age sixty-six. Even if the equity
portion became completely worthless, the PRA account would be worth
the initial $1,000 real dollars.
At older working ages, there are fewer years for the TIPS to accumulate
and, therefore, a larger fraction of the initial saving must be invested in
TIPS. For example, a forty-year-old would have to invest $598 out of each
$1,000 of new saving in TIPS to guarantee the $1,000 value of the account
at age sixty-six with the remaining $402 invested in equities. In practice, of
course, the value at age sixty-six of the annual PRA saving would be worth
substantially more than the guaranteed amount because the equity portion
of the account would add additional value. Indeed, the likelihood (based
on past market returns) is that the equity portion would add very substan-
tial additional value.
The chapter considers a range of “No Lose” options with varying trade-
oﬀs between the guaranteed minimum return and the distribution of pos-
sible higher returns. For example, the approach can be easily modiﬁed to
increase the guarantee from a zero real return (No Lose) to a 1 percent real
rate of return. Indeed, diﬀerent trade-oﬀs might be more or less desirable
to diﬀerent individuals, based on their particular risk preferences. These
options are then evaluated relative to the baseline values that would be pro-
vided through a traditional PAYGO Social Security system. Simulations
are used to derive the probability distributions of retirement incomes rela-
tive to the “benchmark” beneﬁts speciﬁed in current law. Calculations of
expected utility show that the risk reduction techniques developed in the
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no guarantees. Finally, the chapter shows how these approaches might be
applied to deal with the aging of the population without the large rise in the
payroll tax that would otherwise be required.
In closely related work reported in chapter 7, “Pricing Personal Account
Beneﬁt Guarantees: A Simpliﬁed Approach,” Andrew Biggs, Clark Bur-
dick, and Kent Smetters develop a methodology for estimating the market
cost of return guarantees. Given the size of Social Security beneﬁt en-
titlements and the market risks inherent in personal account investing,
guarantees constitute a signiﬁcant contingent liability to the guarantee
provider.
Most of the existing research on guarantees has estimated their cost,
based on a probability distribution of possible investment outcomes, and
then used the distribution to calculate an “expected” cost of the minimum
guarantee. According to the authors, however, this approach does not re-
ﬂect fully how guarantees would be priced in the ﬁnancial marketplace. In
particular, it ignores the greater valuation placed by the market on losses
relative to the expected value of the losses. Indeed, the total “market cost”
of a beneﬁt guarantee, including the associated cost of market risk, could
be several times larger than its “expected cost.” This chapter demonstrates
how a model for calculating the expected cost of a beneﬁt guarantee can be
modiﬁed to present the market price of personal account guarantees as a
supplement to expected cost valuations. The simpliﬁed method for esti-
mating the market price of a guarantee is shown to produce results equiv-
alent to the Black-Scholes model.
The approach is illustrated using a Social Security reform proposal from
Senator John Sununu (R-NH) and Representative Paul Ryan (R-WI). This
proposal would introduce personal accounts investing from 5 to 10 percent
of wages, depending upon the worker’s earnings level. At retirement, indi-
viduals would receive either the proceeds of their personal account or their
currently scheduled beneﬁt, whichever is greater. Thus, this plan eﬀectively
guarantees that accounts would produce beneﬁts no lower than those
scheduled for the current program. In the illustrative policy, the “expected
cost” valuation of the proposed guarantee is calculated to be 11.3 percent
of total beneﬁts to new retirees in 2050, while the “market value” cost is
calculated to be 28.2 percent of beneﬁts.
In chapter 8, “Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual
Level: Life-Cycle Funds and No-Loss Strategies,” James M. Poterba,
Joshua Rauh, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise explore the implications
for asset accumulation of diﬀerent investment strategies. In a Social Secu-
rity system with a personal retirement account (PRA) component, retire-
ment savers would have to decide how to allocate their PRA portfolios
across a broad range of asset classes and ﬁnancial products. Asset alloca-
tion decisions have important consequences for retirement wealth accu-
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low returns. The goal of this study is to assess the relative risk associated
with alternative asset allocation strategies in PRAs, though it also oﬀers in-
sight on the consequences of diﬀerent asset allocation rules in 401(k)-type
plans.
The approach used in the study is to simulate the distribution of balances
in PRA retirement saving accounts under various assumptions about the
asset allocation strategies that investors may choose. In addition to a range
of age-invariant strategies, such as an all-bond and an all-stock strategy,
the chapter considers several diﬀerent “life-cycle funds” that automatically
alter the investor’s mix of assets as he or she ages. These funds allocate a
higher fraction of an investor’s portfolio to stocks at the beginning of a
working career and then gradually decrease the equity fraction as the
worker approaches retirement. The authors also consider a “no lose” allo-
cation strategy for retirement saving, in which households purchase
enough riskless bonds at each age to ensure that they will have no less than
their nominal contribution when they reach retirement age and then invest
the balance in corporate stock. This strategy combines a riskless ﬂoor for
retirement income with some upside investment potential, along the lines
of what is described in chapter 6.
The best asset allocation strategy—the one with the highest expected
utility to the investor—is found to depend on the relative importance of
four issues: the expected return on stocks, the risk aversion of the investing
household, the amount of ﬁnancial wealth held outside the PRA, and the
expenses associated with diﬀerent investment options. At modest levels of
risk aversion, or when the household has access to substantial non-PRA
wealth at retirement, the historical pattern of stock and bond returns im-
plies that an all-stock investment strategy brings higher expected utility
than any of the more conservative strategies. When the expected return on
stocks is reduced, however, other strategies may dominate the all-equity
allocation for investors with high levels of relative risk aversion. In these
circumstances, the value of a mix of stocks and inﬂation-indexed bonds
(TIPS) or an inexpensive life-cycle product may be higher than an all-stocks
strategy.
The ﬁndings also underscore the importance of avoiding high expense
ratios. Many of the available life-cycle products have higher expense ratios
than could be achieved by the household simply holding a stock index fund
and some TIPS (or bonds) and either holding them in ﬁxed proportions
throughout their lifetime or rebalancing toward TIPS (or bonds) as they
get older. Households who are unable to do this on their own will not do
terribly in life-cycle funds, but they will lose money relative to what they
could get if they executed very simple investing strategies on their own.
A very diﬀerent approach to reducing PRA risk is explored in chapter 9,
“Changing Progressivity as a Means of Risk Protection in Investment-
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changes in the progressivity of the Social Security beneﬁt formula as an al-
ternative means of lessening the overall risk for lower-income Social Secu-
rity beneﬁciaries. Because Social Security beneﬁts provide a larger share of
retirement income for lower-income households, Samwick argues, the
most direct way to make sure that they do not fall into poverty in old age is
to increase the progressivity of the beneﬁt formula. Doing so would lessen
the need to provide insurance against the possibility of low returns in the
PRAs because low-income retirees would depend less on their PRAs to
stay out of poverty.
In the illustrative reform plans studied by Samwick, individual PRA ac-
counts are created with contributions of 2 percent of covered earnings per
year. At the same time, traditional Social Security beneﬁts are reduced by
40 percent. Samwick evalues four diﬀerent approaches to the 40 percent
aggregate beneﬁt cut, each with a diﬀerent degree of progressivity in the
beneﬁt formula. The least progressive version would maintain the progres-
sivity of Social Security beneﬁts at its current level, but reduced all beneﬁts
by 40 percent. The most progressive version would provide an equal re-
tirement beneﬁt to everyone, regardless of past earnings. The other two
scenarios are in between, oﬀering moderate increases in beneﬁt progres-
sivity.
A series of simulations are conducted to analyze the implications of these
policy alternatives on the economic well-being of lower income households,
as well as to evaluate the optimal allocation of PRA assets among diﬀerent
asset classes. The key ﬁnding is that under baseline parameters, a ﬂat Social
Security beneﬁt independent of earnings (the most progressive option) al-
lows the bottom 30 percent of the earnings distribution to achieve a higher
expected utility than under the proportional reductions to the current ben-
eﬁt formula even with no investments in equity. An additional 30 percent of
earners can lessen their equity investments without loss of welfare relative
to those available under the scaled-back current formula. Under more real-
istic and less extreme changes to the traditional beneﬁt, about half of the eq-
uity risk can be eliminated for the lowest earnings decile, and some equity
risk can be eliminated for the bottom six deciles.
The optimal allocation to equities in the PRA is not particularly sensi-
tive to the progressivity of the reductions in the traditional beneﬁts—in
most simulations, the optimal share in equities increases slightly for low
earners and decreases slightly for higher earners with more progressive re-
ductions in the traditional beneﬁts.
Demographics, Asset Flows, and Macroeconomic Markets
Many analysts have suggested that population aging will adversely aﬀect
the assets of baby boomers when they retire. These analysts argue that
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retirement, their demand for investments is high, thereby increasing asset
prices. Conversely, when a large cohort retires, they are more likely to sell
their assets to ﬁnance consumption and thereby drive down asset prices.
This argument suggests that the rapidly increasing population of older
people in the United States and around the world might lead to lower re-
turns in ﬁnancial markets in the decades ahead.
The extent to which these predictions will be realized is diﬃcult to pre-
dict. It is particularly diﬃcult in an international context, where macro-
economic markets are interrelated, and where ﬁnancial capital ﬂows freely
across countries. The next two chapters in the volume consider the eﬀects
of population aging on asset markets, one focused on retirement saving in
the United States and one on global ﬁnancial markets.
Chapter 10 is part of a series of investigations by James M. Poterba,
Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise aimed at forecasting the ﬂow of funds
into and out of retirement-related asset holdings in the United States. In
“The Decline of Deﬁned Beneﬁt Retirement Plans and Asset Flows,” these
investigators focus on the ﬂow of funds into and out of “traditional” de-
ﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension plans. A companion study, also referenced in
the chapter, focuses on the ﬂow of funds into and out of 401(k)-type sav-
ings plans. Together, these studies project the direction and magnitude of
asset ﬂows for a very signiﬁcant portion of retirement-related investments.
These analyses provide quantitative documentation, as well as future
forecasting, of a fundamental transition in saving for retirement in the
United States. What we have experienced over the last twenty-ﬁve years is
a massive shift from saving through employer-managed deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) pensions to saving in individually managed deﬁned contribution
(DC) retirement plans, particularly 401(k) plans. Thus, to understand the
eﬀect of demographic trends on the demand for retirement assets in the
coming decades, it is important to evaluate the likely ﬂows into and out of
both 401(k)-type plans and DB plans.
The projections in the chapter suggest that the average (over all people)
of the present value of real DB beneﬁts at age sixty-ﬁve attained an histor-
ical maximum in 2003, when the value was about $73,000. The present
value declines after 2003, as the proportion of new retirees covered by DB
plans declines. The projections also suggest that the average value of 401(k)
assets at age sixty-ﬁve surpasses the average present value of DB beneﬁts at
age sixty-ﬁve in about 2010. Thereafter, the value of 401(k) assets grows
rapidly, attaining levels much greater than the maximum present value of
DB beneﬁts. If equity returns between 2006 and 2040 are comparable to
those observed historically, by 2040 average projected 401(k) assets will be
over six times larger than the historical maximum level of DB beneﬁts at
age sixty-ﬁve, attained in 2003. Even if equity returns average 300 basis
points below their historical value, the authors project that average 401(k)
14 Jeﬀrey R. Brown, Jeﬀrey Liebman, and David A. Wiseassets in 2040 would be 3.7 times as large as the value of DB beneﬁts in
2003.
The oﬀsetting and dominating inﬂuence of 401(k)-type saving, com-
pared with ﬂows in DB assets, is the central conclusion of the analysis. Fo-
cusing on DB assets alone suggests that an aging population, in conjunc-
tion with a shift away from DB plans, will lead to a decline in the real value
of pension assets averaged across all retirees in future cohorts. When com-
bining projected 401(k) assets with projected DB assets, however, the study
ﬁnds that real pension assets not only increase, but increase substantially,
in future decades.
These results underscore the need for further analysis of the factors
thatdetermine the diﬀusion of 401(k) plans across corporations, especially
small companies with low-wage workers, as well as the contribution
behavior and withdrawal behavior of 401(k) participants. The growing role
of 401(k)-type plans in the retirement landscape suggests that understand-
ing asset accumulation and drawdown in these plans is a critical com-
ponent of any analysis of the eﬀect of demographic change on ﬁnancial
markets.
Chapter 11 extends the analysis of demographic change and asset mar-
kets from the United States to international ﬁnancial markets. In “Demo-
graphic Change, Relative Factor Prices, International Capital Flows, and
Their Diﬀerential Eﬀects on the Welfare of Generations,” Alexander Lud-
wig, Dirk Krüger, and Axel Börsch-Supan develop a simulation model to
analyze the impact of demographic change on macroeconomic markets
around the world.
While the size, rate of growth, and age distribution of the population is
changing worldwide, the magnitude of demographic changes and the tim-
ing and character of those changes diﬀer signiﬁcantly across countries and
across regions of the world. There is variation in aggregate population
growth rates and trends, variation in the ratio of the working-age popula-
tion to the total adult population, and variation in the portion of the pop-
ulation at older ages. These demographic variations, and the varying paths
of demographic change over time, aﬀect international ﬂows of capital and
other resources. And these ﬂows, in conjunction with the demographic
changes themselves, aﬀect the macroeconomic characteristics of diﬀerent
countries and the welfare of diﬀerent generations within them.
The authors present the following intuitive explanation, which plays out
in their more rigorous macroeconomic modeling. First, changes in the
population structure will alter aggregate labor supply and aggregate sav-
ings that, in turn, alter the prices for labor and capital. As the working age
population declines, for example, labor will become scarcer, relative to cap-
ital; real wages will increase; and real rates of return to capital will de-
crease. Second, as countries reform their PAYGO pension systems to par-
tially funded systems, the additional supply of capital from those reforms
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fare implications of changing factor prices diﬀer across generations, as
younger generations gain from wage increases and older generations lose
from lower capital returns.
The goal of this study is to quantify these eﬀects in an international con-
text, accounting for international ﬂows of resources across countries.
Much of the work leading up to this study has been in developing an eco-
nomic model to make these calculations.
The study ﬁnds that the rate of return to capital decreases by roughly 80
to 90 basis points if capital is allowed to ﬂow freely across regions. The sim-
ulations indicate that capital ﬂows from rapidly aging regions to the rest of
the world will initially be substantial, but that trends are reversed subse-
quently. However, because long-term demographic trends are highly cor-
related across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries, the capital ﬂows across countries do not aﬀect much
the long-run decrease in the rate of return on capital. In other words, the
impact of open markets in moderating the macroeconomic impact of de-
mographic change within countries is less important because of the simi-
larities in demographic change across countries in the long term.
In terms of the generational welfare eﬀects, the simulations suggest that
for younger households with few capital assets, increases in wages will
dominate the decline in rates of return on capital. For example, abstracting
from Social Security and its reform, the cohort born in 2005 will gain about
0.6 to 0.9 percent in terms of lifetime consumption. Older, asset-rich indi-
viduals, on the other hand, tend to lose because of the decline in interest
rates on capital. However, if demographic changes necessitate reforms in
Social Security, then reduced beneﬁts or increased taxes will moderate the
welfare gains to the younger generation.
Mortality Projections
The ﬁnancial footing of the Social Security system depends importantly
on the longevity of program participants. In the past several decades,
longevity in the United States has increased substantially, adding to the ﬁ-
nancial burden on the Social Security program. What the future holds is
less clear and requires the consideration of multiple factors. In chapter 12,
“Is the U.S. Population Behaving Healthier?,” David M. Cutler, Edward L.
Glaeser, and Allison B. Rosen compare the risk factor proﬁle of the popu-
lation in the early 1970s with that of the population in the early 2000s
andconsider the implications of recent trends for future reductions in mor-
tality.
The ﬁrst part of the chapter estimates the impact of demographics,
smoking, drinking, obesity, blood pressure, and cholesterol on ten-year
mortality rates, comparing the predicted ten-year mortality in the two time
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probability of death fell from 9.8 percent in 1971 to 1975 to 8.4 percent in
1999 to 2002. For the population aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to seventy-four, the ten-
year risk of death falls from 25.7 percent to 21.7 percent. The largest con-
tributors to these changes are reductions in smoking and better control of
blood pressure.
While overall health has improved, not all risk factor trends have been
in a positive direction. Smoking rates have fallen by more than a third
since 1960, and alcohol consumption has declined by 20 percent since
1980, both leading to better health. Demographically, the population is bet-
ter educated, and better-educated people live longer than less-educated
people. On the other hand, obesity rates have doubled in the past two
decades, and diabetes has increased as a result.
The second part of the analysis considers the impact on mortality if cur-
rent trends continue. The mortality forecast integrates together several of
the most important risk factors associated with mortality. Smoking and
obesity are found to be the most important and oﬀsetting components of
the forecast. Based on reduced smoking, the mortality risk for the entire
population aged twenty-ﬁve and older would be expected to decline by 8
percent. Increasing obesity, however, with current treatment rates—leads
to increased hypertension and high cholesterol—and a 13 percent increase
in mortality risk.
While suggestive, the authors emphasize that there is considerable un-
certainty in making health projections for the future. For example, two-
thirds of the U.S. population is overweight or obese. As a result, continued
increases in weight from current levels have a bigger impact on health than
did increases in weight from lower levels of body mass index (BMI). At the
same time, however, the detrimental impact of BMI on health can be mod-
erated dramatically by controlling hypertension and high cholesterol. So
the question is not just whether weight will continue to increase. Also crit-
ical is the extent to which those who are overweight or obese take medica-
tions to control the health risks associated with high BMI. That, too, is
highly uncertain. Understanding how to improve utilization of and adher-
ence to recommended medications are key issues.
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